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A CUE-THEORY OF CONSUMPTION*
DAVID LAIBSON
Psychological experiments demonstrate that repeated pairings of a cue and a
consumption good eventually create cue-based complementarities: the presence of
the cue raises the marginal utility derived from consumption. In this paper, such
dynamic preferences are embedded in a rational choice model. Behavior that
arises from this model is characterized by endogenous cue sensitivities, costly
cue-management, commitment, and cue-based spikes in impatience. The model is
used to understand addictive/habit-forming behaviors and marketing. The model
explains why preferences change rapidly from moment to moment, why tempta-
tions should sometimes be avoided, and how firms package and position goods.
I. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
The patient was a 28-year-old man with a ten-year history of narcotic
addiction. He was married and the father of two children. He reported that,
while he was addicted, he was arrested and incarcerated for six months. He
reported experiencing severe withdrawal during the first four or five days in
custody, but later, he began to feel well. He gained weight, felt like a new
man, and decided that he was finished with drugs. He thought about his
children and looked forward to returning to his former job. On the way home
after his release from prison, he began thinking of drugs and feeling nause-
ated. As the subway approached his stop, he began sweating, tearing from his
eyes, and gagging. This was an area where he had frequently experienced
narcotic withdrawal symptoms while trying to acquire drugs. As he got off
the subway, he vomited onto the tracks. He soon bought drugs and was
relieved. The following day he again experienced craving and withdrawal
symptoms in his neighborhood, and he again relieved the symptoms by
injecting heroin. The cycle repeated itself over the next few days and soon he
became readdicted [O’Brien 1976, p. 533].
Environmental cues sometimes elicit changes in preferences/
behavior. Hence, cues and consumption are sometimes comple-
ments: cues raise the marginal utility of consumption. The nar-
rative above describes an unusually powerful case of this
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phenomenon. Few of us ever experience cue-consumption comple-
mentarities as potent as those of the heroin addict. However, less
extreme examples are commonplace. Consider cues like the smell
of cookies baking, smell of perfume/cologne, sound of ice falling
into a whiskey tumbler, sight of a bowl of ice cream, and sight of
a pack of cigarettes.
Preferences are sensitive to cues like these, explaining why
those preferences often vary from moment to moment. The sight
of a dessert tray at the end of a meal will induce a diner to order
something sweet, reversing an earlier resolution to forgo the
extra calories. Likewise, the sight of a familiar drug-taking envi-
ronment will induce drug craving in an addict, even if the addict
has just completed a six-month detoxification therapy. Cues gen-
erate high frequency variation in preferences/cravings, explain-
ing apparently random behavior. Cues also play a role in the
marketing strategies of firms (e.g., supermarkets create artificial
food smells to stimulate shopper demand and surround checkout
aisles with candy). Moreover, when consumers understand these
mechanisms, consumers try to influence the sequence of cues they
experience (e.g., recovering alcoholics avoid the smell or sight of
alcohol). Cues serve as an important endogenous variable, which
firms, consumers, and governments try to control.
This paper argues that cues are an important determinant of
habit-forming behaviors and that cue effects can be captured
using minor variants of the models that Becker and Murphy have
developed in their papers on rational addiction and advertising
[1988, 1993]. The Becker-Murphy rational addiction model as-
sumes that past consumption is complementary with current
consumption, thereby explaining the formation of habits and
addictions. The Becker-Murphy advertising model assumes that
advertisements (i.e., sensory inputs like cues) are complementary
with consumption, formalizing the role of marketing. The current
paper draws a connection between these two heretofore distinct
forms of complementarity.
The connection is already discussed in the psychology litera-
ture. For example, it is known that heroin addicts experience a
heightened desire (i.e., marginal utility) for heroin consumption
when they experience the cues associated with past use of heroin.
Likewise, cigarette smokers experience a heightened nicotine
craving when they see smoking cues, like an open box of ciga-
rettes. The cues model in the current paper captures these pat-
terns by assuming that habit formation effects are turned on and
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off by the presence or absence of cues (i.e., sensory inputs) that
have been associated with past consumption of habit-forming
goods. Hence, the cues model assumes that a current cue is
complementary with current consumption if that cue has been
associated with consumption in the past. For example, if the
sound of ice cubes falling into a tumbler has reliably predicted
ingestion of Scotch in the past, then that sound will elevate the
current marginal utility of Scotch (i.e., will increase one’s desire
for a glass of Scotch). Likewise, if the smell of baking cookies has
reliably predicted feeding in the past, then the current smell of
baking cookies will elevate the current marginal utility of feeding.
This paper documents and explains the existence of such a
dynamic utility function, using psychological evidence. The paper
then models the choices of a rational decision maker who has
cue-contingent habit formation. The decision-maker can manipu-
late the dynamic pairing of cues and behavior as well as cue-
exposure. The model embeds these preferences in a rational
choice framework that is closely related to the habit formation
model of Becker and Murphy [1988], and assumes an underlying
stable meta-utility structure [Becker 1996].
In the body of the paper I highlight four implications of the
cues model. First, the model generates multiple steady states,
some of which are characterized by cue-contingent marginal util-
ity effects (i.e., cue-based drives). In these cue-based steady
states, equilibrium actions vary at high frequency and depend on
seemingly arbitrary cues (i.e., white noise that is uncorrelated
with any other exogenous variable in the consumer’s problem).
Second, the cues model predicts that consumers will engage in
active cue-management. Under reasonable parameter specifica-
tions, consumers are willing to spend almost all of their income to
manipulate the sequence of cues they experience. Hence, arbi-
trary cues have important welfare implications. Third, the model
predicts that consumers will pay to reduce their own future choice
set, even though the consumers have dynamically consistent pref-
erences. This paradoxical commitment arises because in some
versions of the model, choice sets are linked one-to-one with cues
(you cannot smoke a cigarette without seeing one). Hence, large
choice sets introduce cue-based temptations that are costly to
resist. Fourth, links between cues and rewards imply that the
presence of reward opportunities may generate drives that make
delay of gratification difficult. This explains why consumers often
exhibit extreme impatience over the short run (when the reward
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opportunity cue is present), while maintaining a long-run prefer-
ence for patience.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II summarizes
relevant psychology research, and then presents a dynamic choice
model that integrates these findings. In addition, Section II char-
acterizes the solution of the model. Section III interprets the
model and formally establishes the results outlined here. Section
IV contrasts the view of habits discussed in this paper with the
now standard model of habits presented in Becker and Murphy
[1988]. The new model explains why tastes and cravings change
rapidly from moment to moment, why temptations should some-
times be actively avoided, how firms position and package goods,
and why public consumption generates negative externalities.
Section V concludes.
II. PREFERENCES
This section presents a stable meta-utility function [Becker
1996]. Its functional form is fixed by nature and is beyond control
of the consumer. The following subsection summarizes psycholog-
ical evidence that motivates this functional form.
II.1. Psychological Evidence on Preference Dynamics
Classical conditioning experiments pair a behaviorally neu-
tral cue—e.g., bells in Pavlov’s [1904] dog experiment—with a
behaviorally nonneutral stimulus—e.g., a feeding opportunity. In
Pavlov’s experiment the food elicits salivation. Repeated pairings
of the bells and the food eventually lead the bells to generate the
same salivatory response that was originally generated by the
feeding. Ringing the bells elicits salivation whether or not the bell
is followed by a feeding session. Psychologists call cue-elicited
behavior “conditioned responses.” Many (but not all) conditioned
responses are physiologically preparatory; e.g., for Pavlov’s dogs,
salivation prepares the organism for food ingestion. Such prepa-
ratory responses are generally evolutionarily adaptive. The or-
ganism’s fitness is improved by cue-triggered preparatory mech-
anisms that are based on past associations between cues (the
ringing bells) and behavior (feeding).1
Dozens of studies document the existence of such automatic
1. This paper explores the role of preparatory conditioned responses. For a
discussion about the scope of preparatory conditioning phenomena, see Solomon
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physiological mechanisms.2 For example, exposure to food cues
(e.g., visual, oral, spatial, or temporal) initiates a host of special-
ized digestive processes: salivary, gastric, pancreatic exocrine,
pancreatic endocrine (insulin), thermogenic, and cardiovascular.3
Analog preparatory mechanisms are initiated when organisms
are exposed to familiar drug cues. Many of these preparatory
mechanisms are physiologically compensatory in the sense that
they compensate for or offset the effect of the drug. For example,
rats that have repeatedly received anaesthetizing morphine in-
jections in the presence of a particular cue eventually develop an
increased responsiveness to pain (hypersensitivity) in the pres-
ence of that cue.4 This cue-conditioned hypersensitivity partially
offsets the anaesthetic effect that will be generated if the rat is
subsequently injected with morphine. Offsetting the morphine-
induced anaesthetic effect is adaptive, since the anaesthetic effect
reduces the ability of the organism to respond effectively to ex-
ternal stimuli. When animal (including human) drug users do not
have the benefit of using familiar cues to anticipate and offset
drug effects, they experience much higher rates of overdose.5
Cue-triggered preparatory/compensatory responses tend to
raise the marginal utility of consumption. For example, cue-
triggered salivation and gastric secretion raise one’s appetite for
food. Numerous studies demonstrate that the presentation of food
cues elevate appetite.6 Likewise, cue-triggered hypersensitivity
raises one’s valuation for an anaesthetic drug like morphine.7 The
subjective “craving” of the decision-maker described in the story
[1980], Stewart and Eikelboom [1987], Siegel, Krank, and Hinson [1988], Turkkan
[1989], and the commentaries that accompany the Turkkan paper.
2. Other domains include language, memory, social competition, aggression,
play, substance abuse, pharmacology, immunology, exercise physiology, stress,
digestive physiology, skeletal response systems, cardiovascular functioning, sex-
ual behavior, maternal lactation, and infant suckling. See Siegel, Krank, and
Hinson [1988], Turkkan [1989], Hollis [1997], and Domjan, Cusato, and Villareal
[2000].
3. See Mattes [1997], Rogers [1989], Simon [1986], Woods et al. [1977], and
Woods [1991].
4. See Siegel [1975].
5. Heroin tolerance is relatively low when heroin is injected in an environ-
ment that does not contain the set of cues associated with past use, making
“overdose” from previously tolerated doses more likely in unusual injection envi-
ronments [Siegel, Hinson, Krank, and McCully 1982].
6. See Booth, Lee, and McAleavey [1976], Cornell, Rodin, and Weingarten
[1989], Federof, Polivy, and Herman [1997], Lambert [1991], and Weingarten
[1984].
7. Clinicians commonly report that drug-associated environmental cues elicit
withdrawal symptoms and relapse in long-detoxified former addicts [Siegel,
Krank, and Hinson 1988].
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at the beginning of this paper provides an example of how strong
this cue-induced marginal utility effect can be. A less dramatic
example involves a smoker . . .
who had been a nicotine addict but hadn’t smoked for years. He had ab-
stained from cigarettes in a variety of situations where he had smoked in the
past, and thus he had desensitized himself to a variety of conditioned asso-
ciations—cigarettes at parties, cigarettes at morning coffee, cigarettes at the
desk, and so on. One day he went to the beach and was suddently over-
whelmed by an intense craving to smoke. He found this beyond understand-
ing until he realized that smoking on the beach had been an important
pattern at one time in his life, and that he had not had the opportunity to
eliminate that particular conditioned association [Goldstein 1994, pp 221–
222].8
Such cue-based motivational effects arise in a wide range of
domains, including feeding, drug use, sexual activity, social com-
petition, aggression, and exercise/play.
In summary, repeated pairings of cues and behavior elicits
cue-contingent conditioned responses. Such responses are often
functionally preparatory or compensatory, and effectively elevate
an organism’s appetite (i.e., marginal utility) for the consumption
event that has historically followed the anticipatory cues.
II.2. Formal Model
The following model illustrates the psychological effects dis-
cussed above. It is presented as a model of drug use, but the
principles explored below apply to many other types of habitual
consumption.
Time is discrete, indexed by the nonnegative integers, t 
{0,1,2, . . . }. Each time period a random cue takes on one (and
only one) of two values: RED or GREEN.9
(1) PrRED  R
(2) PrGREEN  1  R  G.
8. This quote was brought to my attention by Elster [1999].
9. The analysis assumes that only two cues exist and that they are readily
distinguished. Naturally, most cues belong on a continuum. A complete model of
cues would need to evaluate consumers’ capacities to discriminate among cues
(“discrimination gradient”) and consumers’ propensities to generalize from one
cue to other related cues (“generalization gradient”). For example, would a heroin
addict who experiences conditioned craving when he sees his dealer also experi-
ence conditioned craving when he sees his dealer’s girlfriend? For experimental
evidence on generalization gradients in nonhuman animals, see Hoffman,
Fleshler, and Jensen [1963], Richardson, Williams, and Riccio [1984], and Cheng,
Spetch, and Johnston [1997].
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Each period the consumer chooses between two activities: an
activity that can be repeated over time, and some alternative
activity that changes every period and hence is not capable of
being influenced by conditioning effects. (Recall that conditioned
responses are built up through repetitive associations between
cues and a particular consumption activity.) I will refer to the
repeatable activity as the primary activity.
Each period the consumer must choose either the primary or
alternative activity. This is a zero-one decision, and it is made
contingent upon the realization of the cue process. Let atR  {0,1}
represent the consumer’s action choice contingent on a RED cue
in time period t. Let atG  {0,1} represent the consumer’s action
choice contingent on a GREEN cue in time period t. A 0 repre-
sents a choice to engage in the alternative activity. A 1 represents
a choice to engage in the primary activity. For example, if the
consumer were to choose atR  1, atG  0, the consumer would
engage in the primary activity if the cue turned out to be RED
that period, and the consumer would engage in the alternative
activity if the cue turned out to be GREEN.
The consumer’s physiology is characterized by two compen-
satory processes: xtR, a compensatory process activated by the
RED cue; and xtG, a compensatory process activated by the
GREEN cue. When the RED cue appears, compensatory process
xtR is activated, and is strengthened or weakened according to the
process:
(3) xt1
R  xt
R 1  at
R.
When the RED cue appears, compensatory process xtG is not
operational, and does not evolve:10
(4) xt1
G  xt
G.
The outcome is flipped when the GREEN cue appears. In this
case, compensatory process xtG is operational, and is strengthened
or weakened according to the process:
10. The assumption that the compensatory process does not evolve if the cue
is not present is consistent with the available evidence on “extinction” (see
Institute of Medicine [1996, pp. 42] and Hoffman, Fleshler, and Jensen [1963]).
Recall the example of the ex-smoker who had not extinguished his association
between beach cues and smoking. Cue-based drives do not decay on their own. The
cue-conditioned addict must be desensitized by repeatedly exposing the individual
to the cue while abstaining from consumption of the addictive good. Finally,
assuming that the cue-based drive decays in the absence of the cue, would not
change most of the qualitative analysis.
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(5) xt1
G  xt
G 1  at
G.
and compensatory process xtR is not operational and does not
evolve:
(6) xt1
R  xt
R.
These cue-sensitive transition processes imply that xtR is a
weighted average of the consumer’s past actions in periods when
the RED cue appeared. Likewise, xtG is a weighted average of the
consumer’s past actions when the GREEN cue appeared. Finally,
note that x0R and x0G are assumed given, and lie inside the unit
interval. This implies that all future values of xtR and xtG also lie
in the unit interval.
The consumer’s instantaneous utility function is cue-contin-
gent. When the RED cue appears, instantaneous utility is given
by
(7) uat
R 	xt
R  1  at
R
,
where 
 is the value (in utils) of the alternative activity, u is
increasing and strictly concave, and 0  	  1.
Likewise, when the GREEN cue appears, instantaneous util-
ity is given by
(8) uat
G 	xt
G  1  at
G
.
Four characteristics of these contingent utility functions
should be noted.
First, the functional form of this meta-utility function is not
chosen by the consumer but is instead biologically predetermined.
As numerous authors have argued, conditioned responses are
generally evolutionarily adaptive. According to Hollis [1982], “the
biological function of classically conditioned responding . . . is to
enable the animal to optimize interaction with the forthcoming
biologically important event” [p. 3]. I take this dynamic system as
a reliable primitive since it is supported by a large body of con-
trolled experiments reported in the neuroscience, pharmacology,
and psychology literatures.
Second, the instantaneous utility functions incorporate the
compensatory processes in a natural way. The compensatory
process offsets the effect of consumption of the primary good.
Such offsetting suggests that the compensatory process in this
particular model be interpreted as an “opponent process” [So-
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lomon 1980]. Opponent processes are a particular type of com-
pensatory process that partially counteracts the effect of the
consumption event.
Third, the preferences in equations (7)–(8) imply that
strengthening of the compensatory process is hedonically aver-
sive: (u[ati  	xti))/xi  0, i  {R,G}. This is a standard
characteristic of the compensatory processes that are associated
with drugs of abuse. These compensatory processes are experi-
enced as craving and withdrawal.11 However, aversive compen-
satory processes do not apply to all habitual activities. Consider
food cues, like the smell of freshly baked bread. Food cues initiate
a compensatory process characterized by appetite arousal and
salivation. In general, appetite-arousing compensatory processes
elevate the level of utility experienced by the consumer if the
consumer actually does eat (i.e., consume the primary good):
u/xi  0, given ati  1. Note that this property does not
characterize the preferences in equations (7)–(8). But, this prop-
erty can be easily modeled. For example, consider preferences
given by u(atixti  	xti)  (1  ati)
. Adopting such preferences
would not change the results that follow.
Fourth, the 
 term in equations (7)–(8) can be motivated in
the following way: assume that the consumer gets perishable
income of $1 every period, which can be allocated to one of two
activities—the primary activity (with price $1 per unit) or the
alternative activity (with price $1) which yields 
 utils per unit.
I assume that the consumer is infinitely lived, and the con-
sumer’s instantaneous utility functions are weighted by an expo-
nential discount function with discount factor . Then the con-
sumer’s value function and Bellman equation are
(9) VxR, xG  max
aR,aG
RuaR 	xR  1  aR

 VxR 1  aR, xG
 GuaG 	xG  1  aG

 V xR,xG 1  aG.
Time subscripts have been suppressed, since all variables in the
equation above are contemporaneous. This value function repre-
sents the welfare of the consumer just before the current period’s
11. See Siegel, Krank, and Hinson [1988], pp. 92–93.
89A CUE-THEORY OF CONSUMPTION
appearance of the cue. The first bracketed term is the consumer’s
welfare conditional on the appearance of the RED cue. The second
bracketed term is the consumer’s welfare conditional on the
GREEN cue. Finally, note that this Bellman equation represen-
tation implies that preferences are dynamically consistent. I will
refer to equation (9) as the Cues Bellman equation.
II.3. Parallels to Becker and Murphy [1988]
The Cues Model is related to the addiction model of Becker
and Murphy. In the Becker-Murphy model, past consumption of
an “addictive” good raises the marginal utility of current con-
sumption of that good.
Compensatory processes, which are embedded in the Cues
Model, provide a microfoundation for the complementarity effects
which are assumed in the model of Becker and Murphy. Recall
that the compensatory variables, xR and xG, can be interpreted as
“stocks” of past consumption. The equation of motion for xi (i 
{R,G}) implies that xi is a weighted average of the consumer’s
past actions in periods when the cue of color i has appeared. The
instantaneous utility function,
uai 	xi  1  ai
,
implies that a high value of xi raises the marginal utility associ-
ated with consumption of the primary good (i.e., the cross-partial
is positive, 2u/aixi  0, since u is concave). Drawing these
effects together, past consumption of the primary good raises the
value of the stock variable, which in turn raises the marginal
utility of current consumption of the primary good. Hence, com-
pensatory processes provide a biological microfoundation for the
marginal utility effects in the Becker-Murphy model.
Because of these similarities, the Cues Model embeds the
Becker-Murphy Model as a special case. Set R  0 or R  1 to
retrieve a discrete choice, discrete time version of the Becker-
Murphy Model. Note that setting R to either 0 or 1 effectively
eliminates the role of the cue. In this case, the Bellman equation
can be rewritten as
(10)
Wx  max
a
ua  	x  1  a
  ˜Wx  1  a,
90 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
where we employ a general discount factor ˜ in anticipation of
results which follow below. To recover a discrete choice, discrete
time version of the Becker-Murphy model, set ˜ equal to the
one-period discount factor, .
The model summarized in equation (10) captures the impor-
tant qualitative properties of the Becker-Murphy Model, but the
two models do not nest each other. First, equation (10) assumes a
discrete choice, discrete time framework in contrast to the con-
tinuous-choice, continuous-time Becker-Murphy framework.
More importantly, equation (10) adopts the instantaneous utility
function u(a  	x)  (1  a)
, where u is any concave function.
Becker and Murphy use the utility function, u(a, x), where u is
quadratic and concave. Despite these differences, equation (10)
captures the critical qualitative properties of the Becker-Murphy
model which were discussed at the beginning of this subsection.
We refer to equation (10) as the No-Cues Bellman equation.
The model summarized by the No-Cues Bellman equation is
closely related to the completely general Cues Model (equation
(9)). Hence, it is helpful to begin the analysis in this paper by
characterizing the solution of the No-Cues Bellman equation.
PROPOSITION 1. The optimal policy correspondence of the No-Cues
Bellman equation is a threshold rule. I.e., there exists
threshold value xˆ such that
a   0 if x  xˆ1 if x  xˆ.
All proofs are presented in the Appendix. To develop intui-
tion for this result, recall the instantaneous utility function,
ua  	x  1  a
.
A high value of the compensatory process, x, raises the marginal
utility associated with consumption of the primary good (i.e.,
2u/cx  0). This effect is mitigated, but not completely offset,
by dynamic considerations.12 When the compensatory process is
strong, consumption of the primary good is optimal, which is the
result in Proposition 1. Hence, the model is said to be character-
12. Specifically, higher current values of the compensatory process raise the
future disutility associated with current consumption of the primary good.
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ized by “adjacent complementarity”: consumption of the primary
good increases (weakly) with the stock of past consumption.13
The comparative static results for the No-Cues Bellman
equation will also prove useful for the analysis of the general
model.
PROPOSITION 2. The threshold value xˆ is increasing with the dis-
count factor, , increasing with the outside option, 
, and
increasing with the compensatory process weighting factor,
1  .
The intuition for these effects is straightforward. First, a
higher value of the discount factor, , implies that the future
takes on greater weight, so current consumption of the primary
good generates more future disutility (since future values of x rise
with current consumption). Hence, higher  reduces optimal con-
sumption of the primary good, which implies a higher threshold xˆ
for primary consumption. Second, a higher value of the outside
option, 
, implies that the alternative good becomes relatively
more appealing, generating a higher threshold xˆ for primary
consumption. Third, a higher value of the weighting factor 1  
implies that current consumption of the primary good has more
impact on values of x in the immediate future, and relatively less
impact on values of x in the distant future. These effects net out
without discounting, but because of discounting the near-term
effects dominate. Hence, consumption of the primary good is
more costly, which implies a higher threshold, xˆ, for primary
consumption.14
II.4. Solution of the Cues Bellman Equation
The Cues Model (equation (9)), is closely related to the No-
Cues Model (equation (10)). Specifically, the value function in the
Cues Model is a weighted average of modified value functions to
the No-Cues Bellman equation.
13. The analysis in Becker and Murphy [1988] focuses on parameter values
that imply adjacent complementarity, but their model admits cases in which
adjacent complementarity does not arise.
14. Comparative statics with respect to 	 cannot be signed unless more
structure is imposed on the function u. When u is linear,  xˆ/	  0, but this
inequality reverses when u is sufficiently bowed.
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PROPOSITION 3.
VxR,xG
R
1 G WxR˜ 
R
1 G

G
1 R WxG˜ 
G
1 R.
Recall that W(  ˜  y) represents a solution to the No-Cues
Bellman equation assuming a discount factor of ˜  y. In essence,
Proposition 3 implies that the Cues Model is a superimposition of
two versions of the No-Cues Model. The first term, R/(1 
G)W( xR˜  R/(1  G)), represents the discounted value
of payoffs that occur when the RED cue is present. The second
term, G/(1  R)W( xG˜  G/(1  R)), represents the
discounted value of payoffs that occur when the GREEN cue is
present. This additive separability arises because the RED and
GREEN compensatory processes temporarily “hibernate” when
the other cue appears. For example, when the GREEN cue is
present, the RED process does not influence instantaneous utility
and does not evolve.
However, the Cues Model is not an exact superimposition of
two No-Cues Models, since the modified discount factors, R/
(1  G) and G/(1  R), are both less than  (the true
discount factor). These modified discount factors reflect the prop-
erty of the Cues Model that current consumption of the primary
good only has an impact on future periods in which the cue
realization is the same as the current cue realization. This effect
mitigates the future cost of current primary good consumption,
and is captured by adopting a lower discount factor in the calcu-
lation of W. Heuristically, R/(1  G) is just the expected
value of the discount factor that will apply between the current
period and the next period in which the RED cue is present:
R  GR2 G2R3 . . .  R/1  G.
Likewise, G/(1  R) is just the expected value of the discount
factor that will apply between the current period and the next
period in which the GREEN cue is present.
Finally, the terms that weight the value functions in Propo-
sition 3 adjust the future weightings so that the sum of weights
over all future RED periods and all future GREEN periods are,
respectively, equal to R/(1  ) and G/(1  ). For example,
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R
1  G 1   
R
1  G   
R
1  G
2
 . . .   R1   .
A formal proof of Proposition 3 appears in the Appendix.
Using Proposition 3 and our earlier results on threshold rules
and comparative statics in the No-Cues Model (Propositions 1
and 2), we are now in a position to characterize the optimal policy
associated with the Cues Model.
COROLLARY 4. The optimal policy correspondence of the Cues Bell-
man equation is a threshold rule. I.e., there exist threshold
values xˆR and xˆG such that
aR   0 if xR  xˆR1 if xR  xˆR
aG   0 if xG  xˆG1 if xG  xˆG.
Without loss of generality assume that R  G. Then xˆR 
xˆG  xˆ, where xˆ is the threshold value from the optimal
policy generated by the No-Cues Bellman equation (˜  ).
This threshold rule follows from Propositions 1 and 3: a
threshold rule solves the No-Cues Model, and the Cues Model is
a superimposition of two modified versions of the No-Cues Model,
so the Cues Model also generates a threshold rule.
The inequality, xˆR  xˆG  xˆ, follows from Proposition 2. The
comparative statics results in Proposition 2 imply that the opti-
mal threshold value falls with the discount factor. When R  G,
the effective discount factors in Proposition 3 obey the inequali-
ties, R/(1  G)  G/(1  R)  , implying that xˆR 
xˆG  xˆ. Intuitively, relative to the No-Cues Model, the Cues
Model implies that today’s consumption is less likely to affect
tomorrow’s utility flow since tomorrow the consumer may expe-
rience the other cue. This makes consumption of the primary good
more appealing, lowering the threshold values below xˆ.
Proposition 2 also generalizes to the Cues Model.
COROLLARY 5. The threshold value xˆR is increasing with the dis-
count factor , increasing with the outside option 
, increas-
ing with the compensatory process weighting factor 1  ,
and increasing with the probability of the RED cue, R. The
threshold value xˆG changes with the same signs, except xˆG
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increases with the probability of the GREEN cue, G  1 
R.
These results follow from the fact that the Cues Model is a
superimposition of two No-Cues Models, in which the discount
factor, , is replaced by the effective discount factors, R/(1 
G) and G/(1  R). Note that these effective discount
factors both increase with , while the first discount factor in-
creases with R, and the second discount factor increases with
G. Higher (effective) discount factors imply higher thresholds for
consumption of the primary good, since the future is effectively
weighted more heavily.
III. INTERPRETATION AND ANALYSIS
III.1. Dynamics and Steady States
The model described above has two state variables: xR and
xG. The evolution of the state variables is characterized by four
basins of attraction in xR, xG space (Figure I).
For example, consider an actor with physiological state vari-
FIGURE I
Steady States and Basins of Attraction
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ables xtR, xtG lying in the interior of the North-West basin of
attraction in Figure I. This implies that
0  xt
R xˆR
xˆG xt
G 1,
where xˆR and xˆG are the threshold values from Corollary 4. These
inequalities imply that the RED cue elicits a relatively weak
conditioned compensatory response ( xtR) and the GREEN cue
elicits a relatively strong conditioned compensatory response
( xtG). By Proposition 1, atR  0, and atG  1: the consumer chooses
the alternative activity when the cue is RED, and chooses the
primary activity when the cue is GREEN.
These cue-contingent actions can be used to derive the one-
period evolution of the state variables. If the cue realized in
period t is RED, then
xt1
R  xt
R 1  at
R xt
R xt
R
xt1
G  xt
G.
If the cue realized in period t is GREEN, then
xt1
R  xt
R
xt1
G  xt
G 1  at
G xt
G 1    xt
G.
Hence, either xtR will fall, or xtG will rise, and hence xt1R , xt1G  will
lie in the North-West basin of attraction. Given the iid distribu-
tion of the cue realization, the two state variables will converge
with probability one to a steady state xR, xG  0,1.15 A simu-
lated partial convergence path is drawn in Figure I.
In the preceding analysis, the weak conditioned compensa-
tory response elicited by the RED cue is self-reinforcing. The
weak compensatory response implies that it is optimal for the
consumer to choose the alternative activity in the presence of the
RED cue. This further weakens the compensatory process asso-
ciated with the RED cue. Likewise, the strong conditioned com-
pensatory response elicited by the GREEN cue is self-reinforcing.
This strong compensatory response implies that it is optimal for
15. A steady state exists at time period T if the state variables are constant
from T forward:
x t
R  xt
W  0  t T.
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the consumer to choose the primary activity in the presence of the
GREEN cue. This further strengthens the compensatory process
associated with the GREEN cue.
The discussion above has focused on one of the four basins of
attraction. Analogous arguments apply to the other basins of
attraction.
COROLLARY 6. Fix parameters for the Cues Model. Assume that
these parameters generate threshold values xˆR and xˆG in the
interior of the unit interval. Then, there exist four locally
stable steady states:
xR, xG  	
0,0
0,1
1,0
1,1.
The existence of these four steady states follows from argu-
ments analogous to those described at the beginning of this sub-
section. These arguments depend on both Proposition 1 and the
equations of motion for the state variables, equations (3)–(6).
The two steady states in the Cues Model that are character-
ized by no cue-sensitivity (xR, xG  0,0 and xR, xG  1,1)
are analogs of the “no addiction” and “addiction” steady states of
Becker and Murphy [1988]. In the 0,0 steady state of the Cues
Model, the optimal action is to never engage in the primary
activity, regardless of the cue outcome. In the 1,1 steady state of
the Cues Model, the optimal action is to always engage in the
primary activity, regardless of the cue outcome.
III.2. Cue-Sensitivity
The difference between the Cues Model and the Becker-
Murphy Model is highlighted by the two steady states in which
behavior is cue-sensitive: xR, xG  0,1 and xR, xG  1,0. In
these steady states, the actions of the consumer depend on real-
izations of the cue process. For example, at the 0,1 steady state,
the consumer engages in the alternative activity when the cue is
RED and engages in the primary activity when the cue is
GREEN. Hence, actions depend on the cue process, even though
the cue process is arbitrary in the sense that the sequence of cues
is independent of all other exogenous variables in the consumer’s
problem. Conditioned responses explain how “neutral” cues come
to generate “real” effects. The intuition behind this result is
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straightforward. A cue matters because the cue has been associ-
ated previously with primary consumption; this association has
generated a cue-contingent compensatory process, which creates
a cue-contingent marginal utility effect, which leads the con-
sumer to choose actions that reinforce the association between
cues and primary consumption.
III.3. Cue-Management
If cues affect welfare, then one would expect that consumers
will attempt to influence those cues. One way to calibrate the
importance of cue effects is to ask how much a consumer would
pay to control the cue process. It is helpful to recall the earlier
motivation for the 
 term in the instantaneous utility function:
“Assume that the consumer gets perishable income of $1 every
period, which can be allocated to one of two activities: the primary
activity (with price of $1 per unit) or the alternative activity (with
price $1) which yields 
 utils per unit.” I want to measure the
consumer’s willingness to give up this income, in return for the
capacity to permanently control the cue process. The next Prop-
osition shows that the willingness to pay can be made arbitrarily
close to all of the consumer’s income.
PROPOSITION 7. For any   1, there exist preferences and cue
probabilities that support a steady state at which the con-
sumer is willing to give up at least  proportion of her
permanent income to permanently control the cue process.
No such parameterization exists if   1.16
This proposition is proved in the Appendix. The idea behind
Proposition 7 is that a parameterization can be found which
drives the consumer’s payoff at a particular steady state to u(0)/
(1  ). For intuition, consider the case where 	 is close to one
(making the compensatory process very effective), R is close to
one (making the RED cue very common), xR is one (making the
RED compensatory process strong), and xG is zero (making the
GREEN compensatory process weak). Then, subject to two other
necessary conditions, the consumer is at a steady state in which
a realization of the RED cue induces a strong compensatory
response that makes consumption of the primary good optimal.
16. For scenarios in which the consumer gives up   1 proportion of income,
I assume zero consumption of the primary good and negative consumption of the
alternative good. E.g., if income is 1    0, then consumption of the alternative
good is 1   units generating 
(1  ) utils.
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This consumer would give up almost all of her permanent income
to force the cue to be GREEN for all future t.
Proposition 7 formalizes the prediction that cues play a po-
tentially important role in welfare analysis.17 These predictions
match up well with reality. Cue-management is a commonly
observed behavioral and therapeutic technique. Real-life consum-
ers routinely manipulate the cues that they experience. For ex-
ample, ex-alcoholics avoid bars, dieters keep snack food out of
view, and parents choose the candy-free checkout aisles at super-
markets.18 One weight management program offers the following
analysis:
Jar of candy on the desk . . . sure I’ll have some. Strolling past a bak-
ery . . . the donuts sure smell good. Popcorn at the movies . . . I can’t resist.
Snacks while watching TV . . . the whole family does it. It’s just about im-
possible to isolate yourself from food and the various signals that remind you
of food. In our society, we’re bombarded with tempting treats that lure us into
unplanned eating episodes. So what can you do? [. . .] You can eliminate some
triggers, such as bowls of candy sitting on your desk. You can stop buying
foods where “you can’t eat just one” [Wellbridge Weight Management Ap-
proach 1998, Section 5, p. 8].
In addition, “cue-desensitization” techniques are now being
used by therapists with patient populations suffering from pho-
bias and addictions [Jansen 1998; Monti et al. 1993; Wardle
1990]. For example, one recently developed technology
places the addict seeking treatment in an immersive virtual reality rig.
While a headset displays a video from a laser disc, sensors monitor respira-
tion rate, pulse rate, perspiration and skin temperature; therapists correlate
spikes in bodily responses to particular scenes from the videodisc. Once the
triggers are identified, [the company] exposes its clients to the most provoca-
tive scenes over and over again. By watching the instrumentation readouts,
the subjects learn to suppress their cravings [Brody 1999, p. 29].
In terms of the Cues Model, cue-desensitization techniques help
addicts lower the value of the cue-contingent compensatory pro-
cesses, xR and xG.19
17. At the Becker-Murphy steady states the consumer is unwilling to give up
any income to control the cue process. At these steady states cues affect neither
actions nor welfare.
18. Alternatively, these decisions can be explained with dynamically incon-
sistent preferences.
19. Analogously, Becker-Murphy consumers who experience aversive addic-
tions would like to be able to lower their accumulated consumption capital.
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III.4. A Different Cue Structure
So far, I have assumed that the cue process is independent of
the other exogenous variables in the consumer’s problem. This
assumption leads the model to understate the importance and
likelihood of cue-sensitivities. I now discard this assumption.
This modeling switch is sensible, since most real-world cues are
highly correlated with reward opportunities. For example, it is
difficult to smoke a cigarette without first seeing one—i.e., seeing
a cigarette cue:
Contrary to what most people might think, craving is not provoked by the
absence of the drug to which a person was addicted, but by its presence—that
is, by its availability. This is illustrated by the nicotine addict who goes
skiing for a whole day, leaving cigarettes behind. No thought is given to
cigarettes—they are simply unavailable. Then back at the lodge, where
nicotine is available again, intense craving strikes, and the addict lights up
[Goldstein 1994, p. 222].20
With the experience of the skier in mind, consider the follow-
ing slightly altered version of the earlier model. The new model
and the old model are identical except that in the new model, the
consumer can only engage in the primary activity when the cue is
RED. This is a physical constraint on the consumer. For example,
imagine that a consumer can only smoke a cigarette (i.e., engage
in the primary activity) when she experiences the cigarette avail-
ability cue (i.e., sees the RED cue).
With these assumptions, the consumer’s value function
becomes
(11) VxR,0  max
aR,aG
RuaR 	xR  1  aR

 VxR 1  aR,0 . . .
 Gu0  
  VxR,0.
Note that this value function is derived by simply setting xG, aG 
0 in the old value function; aG  0 since the GREEN cue signals
the lack of feasibility of engaging in the primary activity; xG  0
since xG is a weighted average of the consumer’s past choices of
aG.21 I refer to this as the Restricted Cues Model.
20. This passage was brought to my attention by Elster [1999].
21. I have also set x0G  0. This is equivalent to the assumption that the
consumer has lived long enough for the GREEN compensatory process to have
decayed effectively to zero.
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Recall that the value function represents the welfare of the
consumer before the current period’s realization of this cue. The
first bracketed term in equation (11) is the consumer’s welfare,
conditional on the appearance of the RED cue (i.e., conditional on
the primary activity being available for consumption). The second
bracketed term is the consumer’s welfare, conditional on the
appearance of the GREEN cue (i.e., conditional on the primary
activity being unavailable for consumption).
The characterization of the general Cues Model (Proposition
3) can be applied to this special case.
COROLLARY 8.
VxR,0
R
1 G WxR˜ 
R
1 G 
G
1  u0 
.
The first term, R/(1  G)W( xR˜  R/(1  G)),
represents the discounted value of payoffs that occur when the
RED cue is present. The second term, G/(1  )(u(0)  
),
represents the discounted value of payoffs that occur when the
GREEN cue is present. During periods in which the GREEN cue
is present, the instantaneous payoff must be u(0)  
. Hence, in
Proposition 3 the term W( xG˜  G/(1  R)) is replaced by
u0  

1  G/1  R ,
which yields Corollary 8.
The value function in Corollary 8 is just a positive linear
transformation of the value function associated with the No-Cues
Model (given ˜  R/(1  G)). Hence, the value function in
Corollary 8 is associated with a maximization problem in which
the instantaneous utility function is a positive linear transforma-
tion of the instantaneous utility function in the No-Cues Model.
Note that optimal policy correspondences do not change when an
instantaneous utility function is translated in this way. Hence,
Proposition 1 and Corollary 8 jointly imply that the optimal policy
correspondence of the Restricted Cues Model is a threshold rule.
COROLLARY 9. The optimal policy correspondence of the Restricted
Cues Bellman equation is a threshold rule. I.e., there exists a
threshold value xˆR such that
aR   0 if xR  xˆR1 if xR  xˆR.
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In addition, xˆR  xˆ, where xˆ is the threshold value from the
optimal policy generated by the No-Cues Bellman equation
with ˜  .
III.5. Commitment as Cue-Management
Subsection III.3 showed that consumers are willing to give up
resources to eliminate certain cues. In the Restricted Cues Model
(introduced in the previous subsection), such cue-elimination is
equivalent to a voluntary reduction in the consumer’s choice set.
In the Restricted Cues Model cues are inextricably linked to
choice sets. (If “smoke a cigarette” is in my choice set, then I
possess a cigarette or am able to acquire one, either of which is a
smoking cue.)
I adopt the term “pseudo-commitment” to describe a person’s
decision to reduce her own choice set for the purposes of cue-
management. Contrast pseudo-commitment with “classical” com-
mitment, which is driven by dynamically inconsistent prefer-
ences. Pseudo-commitment is like classical commitment, because
pseudo-commitment implies that consumers will take potentially
costly actions which reduce their future choice sets (like inten-
tionally not bringing cigarettes on an outing). But pseudo-com-
mitment differs from classical commitment, because the motive
for pseudo-commitment is cue-management. Note that consum-
ers modeled in the current paper have dynamically consistent
preferences. Pseudo-commitment is driven by the property that
cue exposure is hedonically aversive.
In the Restricted Cues Model, the consumer is willing to give
up potentially all of her income to achieve cue-management.
Since cues and choice sets are linked, this willingness implies
that the consumer will potentially engage in highly costly
pseudo-commitment.
COROLLARY 10. For any   1, there exist preferences and cue
probabilities of the Restricted Cues Model that support a
steady state at which the consumer is willing to give up at
least  proportion of her permanent income to permanently
deny herself access to the primary activity. No such param-
eterization exists if   1.
The intuition behind the corollary parallels that of Proposi-
tion 7.
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III.6. Impulsivity as Cue-based Drive
Cue-based models predict that actors will exhibit high levels
of short-run impatience when exposed to reward-availability
cues.22 Intuitively, cues initiate physiological changes that prime
organisms for immediate consumption. When this has occurred,
delaying consumption is costly. The consumer must be generously
compensated to induce her to willingly resist immediate gratifi-
cation of a cue-based drive. The following analysis formalizes this
intuition.
Recall the Restricted Cues Model, and consider a consumer
who is in steady state xR, xG  1,0. Consider the following
procedure, which experimentally evaluates the consumer’s pa-
tience. At time 0, show the consumer the primary consumption
good, which, for discussion, is assumed to be a cigarette. Tell the
consumer she can either smoke one cigarette at period  or 1  
cigarettes at   1. This procedure exposes the consumer to the
cigarette cue at period 0 and in the period chosen for consump-
tion.23 Finally, assume that no other consumption occurs during
the course of this experiment. In summary, the subject is offered
the following two consumption streams:
. . . t   t    1 . . .
Stream A: 0 1 0 0
Stream B: 0 0 1 0.
Assume that the subject picks  to induce indifference be-
tween Streams A and B. To simplify analysis, assume that the
periods are sufficiently short so that it is appropriate to set  
  1.
If   0, then 0 is the solution to the equation,
(12) u1  	xR  u0  u	xR  u1  0 	xR,
where xR  1, (recall the steady state assumption). The left-hand
side of equation (12) represents the instantaneous payoff of
Stream A during periods t    0 and t    1  1. The
cue-induced compensatory process appears in the first term but
not the second term on the left-hand side. The cigarette cue is
22. The ideas in this subsection developed from a conversation with Jeroen
Swinkels.
23. Alternatively, one could assume that the cigarette will be present until
the decision-maker smokes it. This would not change the qualitative results. An
earlier version of the paper analyzes this case.
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present in period 0 for two reasons: the choice question is posed in
period 0, and the good is consumed in period 0.
The right-hand side of equation (12) represents the payoff of
Stream B during periods t  0 and t  1. The compensatory
process appears in both terms on the right-hand side since the cue
is present in period t  0, the period in which the choice question
is posed, and in period t  1, the period in which consumption
takes place.
If u is linear, then 0  	. The extra 0  	 cigarettes
compensate the respondent for failing to satisfy the cue-based
craving in period 0. This craving is strengthened when u is
strictly concave, and in this case 0  	.
If   1, then  is the solution to the equation,
(13) u1  	xR  u0  u0  u1   	xR.
The left-hand side of equation (13) represents the payoff of
Stream A during periods t   and t    1 (given   1). The
compensatory process appears in the first term on the left-hand
side, but not in the second term. The cue is present in period 
since Stream A implies that the good is consumed in period .
Similarly, the right-hand side represents the payoff of Stream B.
The compensatory process appears in the second term on the
right-hand side since Stream B implies that the good is consumed
in period   1.
Regardless of the curvature of u, equation (13) implies that
1  0. Intuitively, the respondent does not need to be com-
pensated for the delay between periods  and   1 since con-
sumption in period  is just as rewarding as consumption in
period   1, as long as   1. Only period   0 is special, since
the respondent experiences a cue-induced craving in period 0
whether or not consumption of the primary good takes place.
Posing the cigarette choice question in period 0 exposes the sub-
ject to a cigarette cue and elevates the marginal utility of
consumption.
Now consider an almost identical experiment, which differs
only because the alternative good is now used. The subject
chooses between one unit of the alternative good in period , or
1   units at   1. Again,  is chosen to yield indifference
between the two streams. For all  0,  solves the equation: 
 
(1  )
. The left-hand side of this equation represents the payoff
of Stream A during period t   and the right-hand side of the
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equation represents the payoff of Stream B during period t   
1. Hence,   0.
How would a naive experimenter use these data to impute
discount factors? A standard approach would use magnitudes like
0, 1, and  as estimates for discount rates. What would this
imply? Recall that ln() is the actual discount factor of the
consumer in this problem. Combining results yields
0 	  1   0  ln.
Hence, the Cues Model predicts that the experimenter will
infer falling discount rates if the experiment is conducted with a
“primary” good, and a constant zero discount rate if the experi-
ment is conducted with an “alternative” good. The intuition for
the former result rests with the cravings that result from the
activation of the compensatory process. When a subject first sees
a consumption cue for a primary good, she experiences a compen-
satory process and prefers to consume the good contemporane-
ously with the compensatory process (i.e., in period 0). If she
cannot consume the good in period 0, then she has relatively little
preference for one future period versus any other. In summary,
the Cues Model draws a distinction between period 0—when the
cue-induced craving has been activated by the choice exercise—
and all future periods—when the cue-induced craving will be
present only if consumption actually occurs. Seeing, and thinking
about the primary good in period 0, creates a craving for imme-
diate consumption in period 0.
These predictions match experiments summarized in
Mischel, Shoda, and Rodriguez [1992]. The experiments identify
cognitive manipulations that enable children to delay gratifica-
tion. The experimenters gave their subjects the opportunity to
either consume a small reward immediately (say, one marshmal-
low) or wait for a larger reward (say three cookies). During the
experiment, both rewards were within reach of the subject. At the
beginning of the session, the experimenter told the subject that
the experimenter would temporarily leave the room, and that the
subject would be allowed to consume the larger reward when the
experimenter returned. The subject was also told that she could
ring a bell, thereby ending the experiment and enabling the
subject to immediately consume the smaller reward, forgoing the
larger one. Waiting time was used as a measure of patience.
In one condition, both rewards were covered when the experi-
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menter left the room. With covered rewards, preschool children
waited an average of eleven minutes. By contrast, uncovering
either or both of the rewards reduced average waiting time to
under six minutes. Hence, Mischel et al. find that reward expo-
sure reduces willingness to wait for a delayed reward, even when
the reward being exposed is the delayed reward.
Laboratory and field studies of time preference find that
discount rates are much greater in the short run than in the long
run. Hyperbolic discount functions capture this property (e.g., see
Ainslie [1992]). The analysis of this subsection, and the experi-
ments reported in Mischel, Shoda, and Rodriguez [1992] suggest
that at least some of the hyperbolic discounting effects reflect
cue-based drives for immediate consumption.
IV. A NEW VIEW OF HABITUATED CONSUMPTION
The predictions of the Cues Model contrast with the predic-
tions of Becker and Murphy’s [1988] habit formation model in
three ways.
First, the Cues Model provides a new framework for under-
standing high frequency variation in craving/marginal utility.
Becker and Murphy [1988] argue that consumption binges are
driven by variation in different kinds of consumption capital.
Becker and Murphy call these “weight” and “eating” capital, and
assume that the former is a substitute and the latter a comple-
ment to eating:
Assume that a person with low weight and eating capital became
addicted to eating. As eating rose over time, eating capital would rise more
rapidly than weight because it [is assumed to have] the higher depreciation
rate. Ultimately, eating would level off and begin to fall because weight
continues to increase. Lower food consumption then depreciates the stock of
eating capital relative to weight, and the reduced level of eating capital keeps
eating down even after weight begins to fall. Eating picks up again only when
weight reaches a sufficiently low level. The increase in eating then raises
eating capital, and the cycle begins again [Becker and Murphy 1988, p. 694].
The Becker-Murphy model predicts that consumption binges
are cyclical. However, the available clinical evidence suggests
that craving episodes and the binges they induce repeatedly arise
with little or no warning and even occur for addicts who have
been detoxified for months. Recall the heroin user who experi-
enced a craving in his old neighborhood and the smoker who
experienced a craving on the beach. Cravings often arise unpre-
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dictably and are “elicited by cues that were associated with drug
availability and drug use in the ex-addict’s previous experience”
[Goldstein 1994, pp. 220–221]. In addition, if an addict experi-
ences a small taste, or “priming” dose of the addictive substance,
he will experience extremely strong cravings [Gardner and Low-
inson 1993]. Such tastes are themselves an important consump-
tion cue.24 The Cues Model predicts that seemingly trivial varia-
tion in situational cues can elicit temporary but powerful changes
in marginal utility. These effects arise in the consumption of a
wide range of goods. “Impulse buying” and unplanned consump-
tion are subjects of active study by retail firms and marketing
experts. For example, surveys find that between 20 percent and
50 percent of supermarket purchases are unplanned, and that
most of these unplanned sales are catalyzed by in-store stimuli.25
The Cues Model explains much of this behavior, predicting which
familiar stimuli—e.g., drug cues, food cues, sexual stimuli,26 so-
cial stimuli27—will cause preferences to vary from moment to
moment.28
Second, the Cues Model explains why and how consumers
work to overcome/regulate their habituated appetites. In the
Becker and Murphy model, staying in the addicted state is an
optimal policy. Addicted consumers would like, in principle, to
have less consumption capital, but there is no way for them to
optimally achieve this. In the Cues Model, addictive/habitual
consumption will be resisted by addicts who can control their
environmental cues. The Cues Model predicts many of the specific
cue-management and quasi-commitment strategies that habitual
consumers commonly use to regulate their own appetites (e.g.,
hide cigarettes, avoid parties where alcohol will be served, use the
candy-free checkout lane, “store tempting treats in ‘see proof’
containers,”29 etc.). The model also predicts the successful strat-
egies that people use to delay gratification (e.g., distract oneself
24. See also Institute of Medicine [1996, p. 46].
25. See Abratt and Goodey [1990].
26. See Domjan, Cusato, and Villareal [1999] and Loewenstein, Nagin, and
Paternoster [1997].
27. See Domjan, Cusato, and Villareal [1999].
28. See McSweeny and Bierley [1984] for additional work on the relationship
between conditioned responses and consumer behavior. In addition, several au-
thors have argued that exposure to credit card insignia elicits conditioned re-
sponses. Some existing experiments support this implication. See Feinberg [1986]
and McCall and Belmont [1996]. In addition, Prelec and Simester [1998] find that
allowing subjects to pay with credit cards raises mean auction bids for goods of
uncertain value by approximately 75 percent.
29. E.g., see Wellbridge Weight Management Approach [1998].
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during the waiting period).30 Moreover, the Cues Model predicts
many of the strategies that firms use to encourage consumers to
make purchases (e.g., install hotel minibars in which snacks and
alcohol are visible even if the minibar has not been opened,
generate artificial appetite-arousing food smells in supermarkets,
package snack food in see-through containers, visually display
dessert options in restaurants, “place candy and gum in all
[checkout] lanes to take advantage of impulse buying,”31 etc.). The
Cues Model explains how firms create temptation and how/why
consumers sometimes avoid it.
Third, the Cues Model explains many of the public dimen-
sions of habitual consumption. The Cues Model implies that cues
can be a negative externality. When an individual experiences a
food cue (e.g., smell of freshly baked cookies), he will feel an urge
to eat. If he is unable to eat, the exposure to the cue will have been
aversive. Think how aversive it would be to watch someone else
eat a meal if you were not able to join in. The Cues Model implies
that food consumption is a jointly complementary activity. Eating
should be done as a group. Hence, norms develop to discourage
individuals from eating in a public space if others are not also
able to eat (e.g., on an airplane, or in a meeting, or at a meal if
one’s companion’s food has not arrived). Firms respond to these
norms by carefully timing the presentation of cues (e.g., good
waiters try to bring all the entrees to the table simultaneously). If
one does need to eat in front of somebody else, the common norm
is to offer to share one’s food, or to wait until the other person’s
food arrives. These externalities are particularly strong in the
case of drug use. The Cues Model predicts that some addicts and
all ex-addicts will be strong supporters of laws that restrict public
smoking and public drinking: “With nicotine, someone else’s
smoking is a potent conditioned cue for lighting up; and that is
why regulations that establish smoke-free environments are so
helpful to nicotine addicts and ex-addicts in reducing their con-
sumption or maintaining their abstinence” [Goldstein 1994, p.
222]. The negative externalities of public cues may also extend to
cues that appear in advertisements. In the United States, adver-
tising for gambling, cigarettes, and alcohol is heavily regulated,
30. See Mischel, Shoda, and Rodriguez [1992] and Jansen [1998].
31. See Wellman [1999].
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and has at times been completely banned.32 Such restrictions are
not predicted by the Becker-Murphy model.
The Cues Model bears much in common with Loewenstein’s
[1996] analysis of visceral factors, “which include drive states
such as hunger, thirst and sexual desire, moods and emotions,
physical pain, and craving for a drug one is addicted to. The
defining characteristics of visceral factors are, first, a direct he-
donic impact (which is usually negative), and second, an effect on
the relative desirability of different goods and actions” [p. 272]. In
the Cues Model, some cues may endogenously become associated
with consumption of an addictive good, and when this happens
exposure to the cue can be aversive (holding actual consumption
constant).33 Moreover, exposure to the cue will temporarily ele-
vate desire for and consumption of the addictive good. In this
sense, the Cues Model is a special case of Loewenstein’s more
general framework. Both the Cues Model and Loewenstein’s
analysis describe a world in which behavior changes rapidly from
moment to moment, temptations can/should be actively avoided,
and public consumption can be a negative externality.
The Cues Model also has much in common with Romer’s
[2000] model of the physiological microfoundations of preferences.
Both the Cues Model and Romer’s model use conditioned learning
as a microfoundation for preference formation. Although it was
developed independently, the Cues Model provides an example of
a particular formalization of both Loewenstein’s and Romer’s
analysis.
V. CONCLUSION
Conditioned responses explain why cues influence motiva-
tional states and behavior. Models that incorporate conditioned
responses explain a wide range of ostensibly puzzling behavior,
including endogenous cue sensitivities, costly cue-management,
commitment, and high levels of measured short-term impatience.
The Cues Model provides a new framework for understanding
addictions. In the Cues Model behavior changes rapidly from
32. For example, since 1934, Federal law and FCC regulations have prohib-
ited broadcasts of gambling advertising. Recently these restrictions have been
legally challenged with mixed success. See United States District Court, D. New
Jersey [1997] and United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit [1998].
33. The aversiveness of cue-exposure depends on the form of preferences. If
preferences take the form u(atixti  	xti)  (1  ati)
, then activation of a
cue-conditioned compensatory process may be desirable.
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moment to moment, temptations should sometimes be actively
avoided, and public consumption can generate a negative exter-
nality. This paper illustrates the broader phenomenon that phys-
iology influences preferences. Conditioned cues provide one im-
portant physiological lever. Understanding the relationship
between physiological mechanisms and preferences will advance
models of behavior.
APPENDIX: PROOFS
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof is divided into four lemmas.
LEMMA 11. Let
fx  

t0

tu	tx 

gx  

t0

tu1 	tx 1 t.
Then, if these functions cross, there exists a unique intersec-
tion point, and f crosses g from above.
Note that f is the payoff function from consuming the
alternative good in all current and future periods, and g is the
payoff function from consuming the primary good in all current
and future periods.
Proof of Lemma 11. By concavity of u,
f x  

t0

t	tu	tx
 

t0

t	tu1  	tx  1  t
 g x. 
LEMMA 12. Let
fˆ x  u1 	x 

t1

tu	tx t11  

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gˆx  u	x 
 

t1

tu1 	tx 1 t1.
Then,
fˆ  x  f x f g x  fˆ x
gˆ x  g x f f x  gˆx.
Note that fˆ is the payoff function from consuming the
primary good in the current period and the alternative good in all
future periods. Similarly, gˆ is the payoff function from consum-
ing the alternative good in the current period and the primary
good in all future periods.
Proof of Lemma 12. We will show that fˆ ( x)  f( x) f g( x) 
fˆ ( x), and omit the parallel argument that shows that gˆ( x) 
g( x) f f( x)  gˆ( x). Let
0x  u1  	x  u	x  

ix  u	ix  i11    u	ix i  1
ix  u1  	ix  1  i
 u	ix  i11    
 i  1,
where x represents xt. Note that i represents the difference
between the (t  i)th period instantaneous utility flow generated
by fˆ ( x) and the (t  i)th period instantaneous utility flow gen-
erated by f( x). Likewise, i represents the difference between the
(t  i)th period instantaneous utility flow generated by g( x) and
the (t  i)th period instantaneous utility flow generated by fˆ ( x).
Note that
gx  fˆ  x  

i1

ii x
 

i1

ii x  

j0
i1
jx  

k0

kkx
since ¥i1 i(¥j0i1 j( x)  ¥k0 kk( x))  0. Assume that
fˆ ( x)  f( x). Then, ¥k0 kk( x)  0. Hence, to show that g( x) 
fˆ ( x), it is sufficient to show that i( x)  ¥j0i1 j( x)  0 for all i 
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1. This last inequality follows from concavity of u and the fact
that x  (1  )  x for all x in the unit interval. 
LEMMA 13.
fx gxf fxfˆ x
gx fxf gx gˆx.
Proof of Lemma 13. Suppose that f( x)  g( x) and f( x) 
fˆ ( x). Then fˆ ( x)  g( x), which implies that f( x)  fˆ ( x), by
Lemma 12. This contradiction proves the required result. A simi-
lar argument proves the second half of this lemma. 
LEMMA 14. The solution to the No-Cues Bellman equation
(14) Wxmax
a
ua 	x 1 a
 Wx 1 a
is given by
Wx  f x if x xˆgx if x xˆ,
where xˆ is the unique crossing point of f and g. If f(x)  g(x)
for all x, then xˆ  . If f(x)  g(x) for all x, then xˆ  .
Proof of Lemma 14. Confirm that the Bellman equation is
satisfied for the candidate function W. Specifically, divide the
state space into four regions. First, consider the region charac-
terized by the inequalities: x  xˆ and x  (1  )  xˆ. In this
region f( x)  g( x) by Lemma 11, and
Wx  f x by assumption
 max  f x, fˆ x by Lemma 13
 max
a
ua  	x  1  a
  fx  1  a
by definition of f and fˆ
 max
a
ua 	x 1 a
 Wx 1 a
by definition of W.
Now, consider the region characterized by the inequalities: x  xˆ
and x  (1  )  xˆ. In this region f( x)  g( x), by Lemma 11,
and
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Wx  f x by assumption
 max  f x, g x by Lemma 13
max
a
ua 	x 1 a
 fx agx 1
by definition of f and g
 max
a
ua  	x  1  a
  Wx  1  a
by definition of W.
Parallel arguments apply for the cases in which x  xˆ, confirming
that the Bellman equation is satisfied for the candidate function
W. 
Lemma 14 implies that the optimal policy generates payoff
function f( x) when x  xˆ, and the optimal policy generates payoff
function g( x) when x  xˆ. Payoff f( x) implies permanent absti-
nence from the primary good. Payoff g( x) implies permanent
consumption of the primary good. Hence, the optimal policy is a
threshold rule, completing the proof of Proposition 1. 
Proof of Proposition 2. By Lemma 14, the threshold value xˆ is
the unique crossing point of the functions f( x) and g( x), defined
in the statement of Lemma 11. Let  represent a parameter of
interest in the model. Then by the implicit function theorem,
dxˆ
d 
f xˆ,   g xˆ, 
gx xˆ,   fx xˆ,  
.
Note that gx( xˆ, )  fx( xˆ, )  0, by Lemma 11. So dxˆ/d takes
the same sign as f( xˆ, )  g( xˆ, ).
To calculate the comparative static on the discount factor, ,
note that
f xˆ,    

i1

ii1u	ixˆ  
1  2 

i0

ifi1xˆ
g xˆ,   

i1

ii1u1  	ixˆ  1  i
 

i0

igi1xˆ  1  i1.
Note that f(i1xˆ)  g(i1xˆ  1  i1) @i, since f and g are
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decreasing functions, i1xˆ  xˆ  i1xˆ  1  i1 @i, and
f( xˆ)  g( xˆ). So f( xˆ,)  g( xˆ,)  0.
The comparative static on 
 is trivial, since f
( xˆ,
) 
g
( xˆ,
)  1/(1  )  0  0.
To calculate the comparative static on , note that
f xˆ,  

i1

i	ii1xu	ixˆ
g xˆ,  

i1

i	ii1 x  1u1  	ixˆ  1  i.
So the difference, f( xˆ,)  g( xˆ,), can be broken down into two
components:


i1

i	ii1xu	ixˆ  u1  	ixˆ  1  i
 

i1

i	ii1u1  	ixˆ  1  i.
Since u is concave and increasing, both series are negative. 
Proof of Proposition 3. This Proposition is proved with a
single Lemma.
LEMMA 15. If W˜ is the solution to the Bellman equation,
W˜xmax
a
ua 	x 1 a
 W˜x 1 a
 1 W˜x,
then
W˜  

1 1  W  ˜ 1 1 .
Proof of Lemma 15. Confirm that the Bellman equation is
satisfied for the candidate function W˜:
W˜x 

1  1   W   ˜  1  1  
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max
a

1  1  
	 ua  	x  1  a
  1  1  
	 Wx  1  a ˜  1  1  
 max
a

1  1   ua  	x  1  a

 W˜x  1  a
 max
a
ua  	x  1  a

 W˜x  1  a  1  W˜x.
The first equality follows from the definition of the candidate
function. The second equality follows from the definition of W.
The third equality follows from the definition of W˜. The fourth
equality is derived by rearranging the equation. 
Continuing with the proof of Proposition 3, let
VxR, xG 
R
1  G WxR ˜  
R
1  G

G
1  R WxG ˜  
G
1  R
and confirm that the candidate function satisfies the Cues Bell-
man equation:
VxR, xG 
R
1  G WxR ˜  
R
1  G

G
1  R WxG ˜  
G
1  R
 W˜ xR  R  W˜xG  G
 max
aR
RuaR 	xR  1  aR
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 W˜xR 1  aRR
 W˜ xGG . . .  max
aG
GuaG 	xG
 1  aG
  W˜ xRR  W˜xG 1
 aGG
 max
aR
RuaR 	xR  1  aR

 VxR 1  aR, xG . . .
 max
aG
GuaG 	xG  1  aG

 V xR,xG 1  aG. 
Proof of Proposition 7. Fix u and 
 such that u(1)  u(0) 

  u(0)  u(1). This is possible since u is strictly concave. Let
	    R  1  , with   0. For sufficiently small , xR, xG
 1,0 is a steady state:
lim
30
WxR ˜  R1  G WxR˜  

u0
1   since
u0
1   
u1  

1  
lim
30
WxG ˜  G1  R W xG˜  0  u0  

since u0  
  u1.
A cue-management decision to permanently set the cue GREEN
(starting from steady state xR, xG  1,0) yields future payoffs
of (u(0)  
)/(1  ). And lim30 V( xR, xG)  u(0)/(1). This
proves the main claim of the proposition.
The final claim in Proposition 7 can be shown by noting that
of the four possible steady states, (xR, xG  {0,0, 1,0, 0,1,
1,1}), the consumer gains nothing by controlling the cue process
when she is in either the first or last steady state. WLOG assume
that the consumer is in steady state 1,0. The best cue-manage-
ment decision that the consumer can take is to permanently set
the cue GREEN. This yields a change in welfare of
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u0  

1    V1,0

u0  

1   
R
1  G WxR ˜  
R
1  G

G
1  R WxG ˜  
G
1  R

u0  

1   
Ru1  	  1  Ru0  

1  

Ru0  
  u1  	
1   


1  .
The last inequality follows from the fact that u(0)  
  u(1 
	)  0 (which is a necessary condition for existence of the 1,0
steady state), and u(0)  u(1  	) (which follows from monoto-
nicity of u, and 0  	  1). 
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